West Bengal Violence: Govt Neglect & Politics Of Polarisation

The communal violence that erupted in Murshidabad, West Bengal, in April 2025, leaving three dead, hundreds displaced, and vehicles torched, is a stark testament to the deepening fault lines in the state’s political landscape. Triggered by protests against the Waqf (Amendment) Act, the unrest exposed the administrative failures of Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress government, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s unrelenting push for Hindutva-driven polarisation, and the high stakes of the 2026 West Bengal Assembly election.

This episode is not an isolated flare-up but a grim preview of a state hurtling toward a bitterly contested electoral battle, where communal narratives threaten to overshadow governance and accountability. The Murshidabad violence lays bare the interplay of administrative incompetence, cynical political strategies, and a polarised electorate, setting the stage for a volatile path to 2026. Mamata Banerjee’s administration has faced relentless criticism for its inability to anticipate or contain the Murshidabad unrest.

Despite prior intelligence about planned protests, the state police appeared unprepared, with reports indicating officers hesitated to act until the Border Security Force (BSF) arrived. The violence, concentrated in Muslim-majority areas like Dhulian and Shamsherganj, saw mobs vandalise homes, torch vehicles, and attack government offices, with a Block Development Office reduced to rubble. The Calcutta HC’s order to deploy central forces underscored the state’s failure to maintain order. Mamata’s response, labelling the riots “pre-planned” and blaming the BJP, BSF, and alleged Bangladeshi infiltrators, did little to quell perceptions of administrative paralysis.

Her announcement of Rs 10 lakh compensation for victims and promises to rebuild homes under state schemes came across as reactive, failing to address the immediate breakdown of law enforcement. Critics argue that her government’s reliance on appeasement politics, particularly toward the state’s significant Muslim population, has emboldened radical elements, creating a governance vacuum. The TMC’s inability to swiftly control the situation, coupled with the displacement of families to Malda and Jharkhand, has fuelled narratives of a state administration out of its depth, unable to secure its citizens or borders.

The BJP has seized on this chaos to amplify its aggressive Hindutva agenda, framing the violence as a symptom of Mamata’s “minority appeasement” and a threat to Hindu communities. Leaders like Suvendu Adhikari and Sukanta Majumdar have claimed over 400 Hindus were “forced to flee” Murshidabad, alleging “religious persecution” under the TMC rule. The party’s rhetoric, laced with terms like “Jihadist forces” and “Islamic Caliphate”, paints a dystopian picture of Bengal under Mamata, accusing her of ceding control to radical mobs. This narrative dovetails with the BJP’s broader electoral strategy for 2026, which hinges on consolidating Hindu votes, already over 39% of the state’s electorate, by stoking fears of demographic and cultural erosion.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act has become a flashpoint, with the party leveraging protests to portray itself as a defender of Hindu interests against Muslim assertiveness. Yet, this approach risks alienating secular and progressive voters, as analysts warn that overt communalism could consolidate Muslim votes (over 30% of the electorate) behind the TMC. The BJP’s doubling down on Hindutva, evident in its Ram Navami processions and slogans like “Batenge to Katenge”, reflects a calculated gamble to polarise the electorate, even at the cost of social cohesion. Mamata, long accused of Muslim appeasement, has countered with her own brand of “soft Hindutva”, declaring herself a “proud Hindu Brahmin”. This shift, a response to the BJP’s inroads into Hindu voters since 2019, aims to retain her diverse voter base while deflecting accusations of bias.

Her public appeals for peace and meetings with Muslim clerics to pacify sentiments over the Waqf Act were overshadowed by her administration’s failure to prevent violence. The TMC’s electoral calculus is clear: consolidate Muslim votes while preventing Hindu vote erosion to the BJP. However, the Murshidabad unrest has complicated this strategy. The violence, coupled with the fallout from the school jobs scam that cost 26,000 jobs, has dented the TMC’s image as a competent governing force. Mamata’s fiery rhetoric seeks to rally her base under the “Khela Abar Hobe” slogan, but it struggles to mask the governance lapses exposed by Murshidabad.

The road to 2026 is fraught with peril for both parties. The TMC, projected to win over 200 seats based on current polls, relies on its organisational strength and Mamata’s populist appeal. Yet, the Murshidabad violence has given the BJP ammunition to intensify its narrative of a “failed state” under TMC rule, potentially swaying urban and semi-urban Hindu voters rattled by communal tensions and events in neighbouring Bangladesh. The BJP’s challenge is to expand its vote share beyond its Hindutva core without alienating allies or moderates. Meanwhile, the Congress and CPI(M), though weakened, have criticised both parties for polarising the electorate, with leaders like Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury pointing to administrative lapses and the BJP’s divisive tactics.

The violence has also shifted focus from pressing issues like unemployment and corruption, allowing communal narratives to dominate discourse. The TMC’s administrative failures have handed the BJP a potent weapon to wield its Hindutva rhetoric, while Mamata’s countermeasures risk further entrenching communal divides. As 2026 looms, the state faces a stark choice: a governance-focused campaign or a descent into competitive communalism. The violence has exposed not just the fragility of Bengal’s social fabric but also the willingness of its political actors to exploit it for electoral gain. If unchecked, this cycle of administrative neglect and polarising politics could redefine Bengal’s electoral landscape, with consequences far beyond 2026.

The author, a columnist and research scholar, teaches journalism at St. Xavier’s College (autonomous), Kolkata. His handle on X is @sayantan_gh.

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