Kautilya in the classroom: Integrating ancient jurisprudential heritage from Vedas, Mahabharata, and Ramayana into modern legal education
Justice Pankaj Mithal of the Supreme Court of India recently proposed that Indian law schools should introduce a course titled “Dharma and Indian Legal Thought” or “Foundations of Indian Jurisprudence.” His suggestion is not simply a call to add one more elective to an already packed curriculum, but an invitation to engage deeply with India’s own intellectual and legal heritage. This call compels us to revisit the structure and content of Indian legal education, which, to this day, remains disproportionately centred on Euro-American jurisprudence, to the neglect of indigenous traditions.
Today, Indian law students are required to understand Blackstone, Bentham, Austin, and Hart. They are expected to trace the lineage of Western law through Roman edicts, the Code of Hammurabi, the Magna Carta, and the Napoleonic Code. In contrast, limited structured exposure exists to foundational Indian texts such as the Vedas, Dharmaśāstras, the Arthaśāstra, or the epics Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. The consequence is a conceptual imbalance where students are left unaware of the deep jurisprudential reasoning embedded in India’s own civilizational history. These texts engage with jurisprudential questions concerning justice, governance, rights, duties, and the moral foundations of law. Their inclusion in academic discourse would not only provide continuity with India’s legal evolution but also offer a rigorous philosophical base for examining contemporary legal questions.
Ancient Indian Legal Texts as Jurisprudential Foundations
The Vedas and the concept of Ṛṭa provide the metaphysical foundation of Indian legal thought. In the śvetāśvataropaniṣadand and other early texts, Ṛṭa refers to a cosmic order, a principle of truth and balance that governs the universe. Later, Ṛṭa evolves into “dharma”, a broader moral-legal principle that governs not only individual conduct but also the functioning of society and polity. This contrasts with the Western concept of natural law, which, although also based on reason and morality, often posits a divine lawgiver external to the cosmos. In Indian thought, dharma is internal, not imposed from above but discovered through wisdom, practice, and dialogue.
The Mahābhārata, particularly the Śānti Parva, is perhaps the most elaborate legal-ethical dialogue in world literature. Yudhiṣṭhira’s questions to Bhīṣma cover the nature of justice, the duties of a king, the role of truth, and the complexity of moral choice. The repeated assertion that “dharma is subtle” (dharma sūkṣmaṣca) indicates a clear understanding that justice cannot be reduced to formulae. Bhīṣma’s principle, “that which leads to the welfare of living beings is dharma,” anticipates utilitarian concerns but grounds them in a moral context. In contrast, Western utilitarianism (e.g., Bentham and Mill) tends to rely on consequentialism devoid of intrinsic moral orientation.
Further in the Mahābhārata, the concept of rājadharma, i.e. duties of a ruler, is elaborated in practical terms. The king is bound by dharma, and his legitimacy derives from adherence to it. The threat of matsya-nyāya (“law of the fishes”) warns against anarchy when dharma is abandoned. There is even a proto-constitutional idea that the people have the right to revolt against a ruler who acts against dharma. This is similar in spirit to Locke’s right of rebellion against tyrants, but appears in Indian literature centuries earlier.
The Rāmāyaṇa reinforces legal-moral themes through narrative. Rāma, as Maryādā Puruṣottama, upholds justice (maryādā) even when it involves personal sacrifice. His actions emphasise the idea that rulers must embody public morality. Rāma’s kingdom, Rāma Rājya, becomes a cultural symbol for governance based on justice, order, and welfare. This image of ideal governance offers a benchmark similar to Plato’s “philosopher-king” but embedded in the Indian ethical worldview.
The Dharmaśāstra corpus, particularly the Manusmṛti, Yājñavalkya Smṛti, and Nārada Smṛti, constitutes structured efforts to codify laws. Contrary to popular perception, these texts were not fixed commandments but evolving bodies of law, often contested and reinterpreted by subsequent commentators. The Manusmṛti, for example, outlines a legal structure comprising civil law (dhanadharma), criminal law (daṇdadharma), and family law (strīdhana, āśraama-dharma). It emphasises proportionate punishment, procedural justice, and the king’s responsibility in adjudication.
These texts also reflect early forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution. They describe the role of community-based decision-making bodies such as kula (family assemblies), śreṇi (guild courts), and puga (associational courts). Their role was recognised formally, and their judgments considered binding unless overturned by the rāja sabhā. This resembles the tiered dispute resolution system in modern law and demonstrates that the principles underlying arbitration and mediation were well-established in ancient India.
The Yājñavalkya Smṛti presents more refined and arguably more progressive views, especially on women’s property rights and the role of evidence. It accepts the daughter’s right to inherit in the absence of a son, centuries before this became codified in modern Hindu law. It also outlines types of evidence such as documents (lekhya), witnesses (sākṣin), and possession (bhoga), forming a foundation for evidentiary rules.
Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra stands as a secular, pragmatic text. Composed around the 4th century BCE, it deals extensively with administrative, commercial, and criminal law. The Arthaśāstra is distinct from Dharmaśāstra in that its central concern is not religious duty but effective governance. Yet, it does not abandon ethical considerations. It holds that a king’s happiness lies in the welfare of his subjects, echoing the idea of fiduciary responsibility. Kautilya prescribes systems for the regulation of trade, the protection of consumer rights, and the prevention of corruption through a network of auditors and spies. The book includes a complex classification of crimes and punishments, rules of evidence, and procedures for statecraft and diplomacy. It also accepts local customs and guild rules as sources of law, paralleling modern notions of legal pluralism.
The Edicts of Aśoka, inscribed on rocks and pillars across the Indian subcontinent in the 3rd century BCE, constitute another important source. Aśoka embraced dhamma, which he defined in terms of compassion, tolerance, truthfulness, and charity. His edicts call for humane treatment of prisoners, welfare of animals, equitable treatment of all religious groups, and ethical governance. He appointed Dhamma Mahāmātras to implement these principles, functioning as proto-ombudsmen. Aśoka’s commitment to non-violence and pluralism aligns with modern human rights discourse. Unlike many ancient rulers, Aśoka institutionalised moral policy without imposing religious orthodoxy, a balance modern democracies also attempt to strike.
Law is not only a technical field but also a humanistic one. It is embedded in history, ethics, and society. Legal education must thus include reflective engagement with foundational ideas. Including ancient Indian legal texts provides this dimension. These texts promote a layered understanding of justice from individual ethics to institutional legitimacy.
Comparative Jurisprudence and Curriculum Innovation
In Western legal education, ancient sources are standard components of curricula. Roman law is a compulsory subject in many European law schools, especially in civil law countries like Germany, Italy, and France. It is studied not because Roman codes are directly applicable today, but because they shaped the conceptual language of private law and procedural reasoning. In the UK, legal history is taught to understand the evolution of equity, common law, and the constitutional tradition.
At Oxford University, Roman Law has been a mandatory subject since 1149. This long-standing tradition acknowledges that historical jurisprudence deepens analytical capacity. Students of law, by examining the legal thought of Cicero or Justinian, learn the methods of legal interpretation, categorization, and normative justification.
A similar rationale justifies the inclusion of Indian classical texts in Indian legal education. Texts such as Manusmṛti, Arthaśāstra, and Mahābhārata do not offer ready-made laws for the modern world, but they cultivate jurisprudential reasoning. They invite students to analyse competing principles, evaluate normative frameworks, and appreciate the socio-legal complexity that characterised pre-modern Indian society.
Incorporating these texts can be done within existing subjects such as Jurisprudence, Legal History, or Comparative Law. Alternatively, dedicated electives can be offered. Course design should prioritise critical engagement. For example, caste-based norms in Manusmṛti can be studied in contrast with egalitarian verses in the Mahābhārata and current constitutional values. The aim is to enable students to analyse indigenous sources with the same analytical rigour applied to Western theorists such as Austin, Hart, or Dworkin.
My Experience: A Case from Gujarat National Law University
As a law student at Gujarat National Law University, I had the opportunity to enrol in a course on Indian Legal History. Initially, I approached the subject with uncertainty, as legal education often emphasises statutes, case law, and modern theory. However, the course offered a distinctive intellectual experience. The course instilled in us the awareness that Indian legal philosophy is not monolithic. It contains contesting voices, reforms, and philosophical reflections. The critical study of these texts did not promote orthodoxy, but intellectual maturity. It provided historical context for understanding contemporary legal reforms and socio-legal attitudes. The course developed my analytical skills, broadened my jurisprudential vocabulary, and introduced me to a tradition of legal thought with both historical depth and contemporary relevance. It showed that concepts such as procedural fairness, equity, restorative justice, and environmental stewardship were not imports but part of India’s legal heritage.
Towards an Integrated and Rooted Legal Education
The inclusion of ancient Indian legal thought in legal curricula should not be viewed as nostalgic or nationalistic. It is a necessary correction to a longstanding imbalance. It aligns with global academic standards, enriches jurisprudential training, and promotes contextual legal understanding.
Justice Mithal’s proposal opens a path toward a more integrated and reflective legal education. It urges Indian law schools to draw from their intellectual heritage in shaping future jurists. Such a move would not displace modern legal knowledge but deepen it. A generation of lawyers equipped with knowledge of both Hart and Kautilya, both Dworkin and Bhīṣma, would be better prepared to address India’s legal challenges with intellectual confidence and ethical clarity.
Ultimately, law is not merely a system of rules but a vehicle of justice. Understanding how Indian traditions have conceptualised justice, from Ṛṭa to dharma to nyāya, is indispensable to creating a legal system that is both responsive to present needs and rooted in the wisdom of the past.
(The views expressed are inspired by the speech of Justice Mithal, who was speaking at the inaugural ceremony of the Legal Conclave commemorating 75 years of the Supreme Court of India.)
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