Mumbai to Pahalgam: India's unfinished battle against terrorism

Terror attacks like the one witnessed in Pahalgam affect the entire country—its people, its government, and its institutions. They evoke feelings of helplessness, regret, and a strong desire for retribution. The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was one such incident that shook an otherwise resilient nation and plunged it into a war from which it now finds it extremely difficult to extricate itself. It is, therefore, far better to prevent such incidents from occurring than to react to them later.

Since the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008 in which 126 innocent civilians were killed, India has seen fewer large incidents like Pulwama in which 40 CRPF personnel lost their lives in 2019. This reduced frequency of terror incidents had provided the Indian citizens with a sense of security, a feeling that nothing untoward is going to happen even in Kashmir. We all believed that the abrogation of Article 370 and a successful election had turned the tide and shown the door to militancy.

This enthusiasm and positivity in the Indian public was not without reason. Successive governments had worked hard for it and many good initiatives were taken to fight terrorism. The Multi Agency Centre (MAC) for sharing of intelligence, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for faster convictions, stronger anti-terror laws like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and effective action on terror funding had a positive impact on the war against terror.

The MAC and its ability to obtain and share actionable intelligence more so obtained from technical sources has been a game changer. The counter-terrorism forces which includes the Army, National Security Guard, central armed police forces and the state police have also developed the ability for a faster response through better training, leadership and equipment.

Terrorists adapting and innovating: A new challenge

However, the terrorists, duly supported by external forces, are also innovating and exploiting technology. They are employing drones for direct attacks, as seen in the Jammu Air Force base incident of 2021, and for the delivery of weapons. The internet is being extensively utilised for secure communication and propaganda purposes. In addition, deepfakes — an outcome of the integration of artificial intelligence and multimedia manipulation techniques — have also been adopted by many terrorist organisations for spreading disinformation.

Aware of the growing technical intelligence capability of the Indian state, they are taking adequate precautions to ensure their plans are not compromised. Software’s like Rocket.Chat has found favour with terrorist organisations across the world for the secrecy and security it offers.

The internal and regional landscape

Externally, the situation around India is volatile and highly conducive for terrorist operations. While Pakistan is infamous for providing funding and infrastructure to many anti-India terror groups, the situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh has also deteriorated. This necessitates significant improvement of the border guarding mechanisms including the security of the vast Indian coastline.

Internally too, radicalisation and polarisation due to increased awareness and access to social media have increased. Social media provides the terrorists with access to local support in the form of intelligence, logistics and hideouts. It is a well-established fact that terrorists cannot operate without local sympathisers.

While the insurgency in the Northeast and Naxalite areas is at a low ebb, the upswing amongst Khalistan supporters and the Pahalgam incident is a reminder that Northwest India will require more focussed attention in the times to come.

Addressing functional challenges: A crucial step

Despite the notable initiatives of the last two decades since Mumbai attacks resulting in the overall reduction of terrorist activities, there is considerable scope for improvement of the overall Indian security architecture. The current setup does suffer from multiplicity of stakeholders, inter-agency one-upmanship, inadequate cooperation, lack of well-coordinated operations and a dearth of accountability.

Jammu and Kashmir has a unified command wherein the senior functionaries of the security agencies meet frequently to discuss operational issues, share intelligence and improve coordination. The system, although not fully institutionalised, has stood the test of time and delivered results. However, similar coordination mechanisms at the district level do not exist and it is left to the personality and initiative of local officers to coordinate and work together.

Places like Pahalgam have seen a thinning of troops in the recent past but still have a plethora of units from the Army, central armed police forces, state police and intelligence organisations. Regular security meetings are conducted either by the  District Commissioner or by the Army Formation Commanders to coordinate operations and to share intelligence. However, units from different organisations operate on their own without any central control.  At times, these local units do not even have an integrated communication network and they connect through commercial mobile service providers. There is a definite need for better functional and coordination systems at the ground level.

As far as the Pahalgam incident is concerned, it is no surprise that Pakistan planned it; after all, they can’t allow Kashmir to return to normalcy. However, the fact that they succeeded in executing it, is a matter of concern. It definitely indicates gaps in our intelligence and security set up and thus there is definitely a need to examine this matter and plug the gaps.

One aspect which often gets neglected in the Indian context is the fixing of political and bureaucratic accountability. Without promoting the zero-error syndrome, there is a need for everyone to know the reasons for such a major security incident and what steps the government is going to take so that these are not repeated in the future.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.

Defence