Drones are changing war and India must catch up
IN a seminar hosted by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies on March 10, General Anil Chauhan, India’s Chief of Defence Staff, emphasised the transformative role of unmanned aerial systems, commonly known as drones, in modern warfare and called for doctrinal clarity on the employment of drones.
Drones have been around for decades in the military arsenal of countries. What is new is the extensive use of drones in the Russia-Ukraine war, from the tactical battlefield to achieving strategic effects. As the Indian military increasingly looks to induct drones into service, key insights from the Ukraine conflict should guide this effort.
The start of the Ukraine war saw the traditional employment of large, slow-flying drones, like Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 and Russia’s Orion, in surveillance and strike roles. However, these drones were vulnerable to air defence systems and soon disappeared from the skies, replaced by smaller military drones, like the Ukrainian Furia and the Russian Orlan-10.
The real transformation occurred when Ukraine turned to commercial off-the-shelf drones, repurposing thousands of them as combat tools. By the war’s second year, drone operations had massively expanded in scale and sophistication. In 2023, the Ukrainian army raised over 60 special drone strike units embedded in combat brigades and independent drone groups, institutionalising drone warfare.
With the increasing role of drones on the battlefield, their numbers expanded exponentially. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, said over 1.3 million drones had been delivered to frontline soldiers in 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia was ramping up its drone production to nearly 1.4 million in 2024, a tenfold increase from the previous year.
Today, small quadcopters costing less than $1,000 dominate the tactical battlefield, carrying out a variety of roles —intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and kinetic strikes. This omnipresence of drones has dramatically compressed the kill chain: spotting a target and directing fire on it is often done in just minutes or even seconds. A February 2025 study by the Royal United Services Institute estimates that tactical drones account for 60 to 70 per cent of the damaged and destroyed Russian systems.
Russia’s success in driving Ukrainian forces out of Kursk in March 2025 has been attributed to the mass employment of fibre-optic drones. These drones are tethered to their operator via a physical cable and are immune to electronic jamming. Ukraine troops described their retreat from Kursk as a “horror movie" as drones “hunted them day and night."
Drones have also had strategic impacts away from the frontlines. Ukrainian uncrewed surface drones (USVs) have sunk Russian warships, compelling Russia to relocate much of its Black Sea fleet to ports like Novorossiysk, effectively ceding control of large parts of the Black Sea. USVs carrying drones have attacked Russian gas platforms and other targets around the Black Sea.
As drones proliferate in the Indian military, they must not be treated as standalone assets but integrated into a combined arms operation. The control of thousands of drones in the sky will require a network-centric approach to manage the information overload. Ukraine has adopted the DELTA system, which integrates data from multiple sources, including drone video feeds, open-source intelligence and satellite imagery, to present a real-time picture to commanders, enabling quick targeting.
A current deficit in India’s military power is the limited inventory of conventional missiles for engaging targets deep in enemy territory. Long-range strike drones can fill this gap. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia carried out 8,484-long-range strikes against Ukraine between September and December 2024. More than 90 per cent of these strikes were carried out by attack drones, mostly Shahed drones imported from Iran. While relatively slow and often intercepted, the Shaheds are cheap (about $35,000 each) and are being used in large numbers as expendable cruise missiles. As a comparison, Russian missiles like the ground-launched Iskander and air-launched
Kh-22 cost around $10,00,000.
Technology sans doctrine is of little use. The Indian military will have to evolve a comprehensive doctrine around drone warfare. Constant surveillance over the battlefield and the ability to quickly hit individual targets is forcing troops to disperse and remain hidden, making mass surprise attacks difficult. The operational tempo and decision cycles have compressed, requiring greater delegation and initiative from local commanders. Fundamental changes would have to be made in how the Army fights.
In a highly contested airspace and a plethora of air defence systems, drones will play a key role in deep observation and targeting. The Air Force will have to develop doctrines for manned-unmanned teaming of fighter aircraft and drones. The drones will carry out the role of surveillance, electronic warfare and other risky tasks while the manned aircraft deliver strategic strikes. Strategies will also have to be formulated for defending airspace from mass drone attacks. An effective defence will require a layered approach, combining detection, disruption and destruction, with electronic warfare as a critical component.
The Navy will have to integrate drones as strategic strike assets while reviewing the concept of coastal and harbour defence to protect from attacks by surface or underwater drones. Like the Air Force, the Navy must look at the concept of manned-unmanned teaming in fleets.
Organisational changes must accompany doctrinal development. Merely allocating drones to existing units will result in suboptimal employment. Specialised drone units will have to be created within all three services and there will be a requirement to raise additional electronic warfare and counter-drone units.
Such a proliferation of roles will require mass manufacturing of drones and production capacity will have to be ramped up quickly. This necessitates an extensive participation of the civil sector and changes in the defence procurement process to make it more agile.
The jury is still out on whether drones have completely transformed how future wars will be fought, but it is a reality that drone warfare has become a central feature of modern combat. The Indian military must put doctrines and organisational structures in place to exploit this new weapon of war.
Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is former Northern Army Commander.
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