Coercion is the norm for India, Pak

INDIA has suffered another horrendous Pakistan-sponsored terror attack that has claimed the lives of tourists from across the country. It has rudely shaken the sense of normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir.

This attack, which may not be the last, is yet another reminder that after suffering Pak terror for more than 40 years, several peace moves and our avowed muscularity of the last decade, there is no end to this scourge. There is a complete impasse in the bilateral relationship, diplomacy has taken a back seat and both countries are dependent on deterrence and coercion to manage it. Pakistan has all along regarded state-sponsored terrorism as an instrument of coercion. The relative restraint it exercised on its terror machine in recent years was the result of internal compulsions and FATF scrutiny. However, sporadic, small terror attacks never ceased.

There have been telltale signs of late that Pakistan might try to ratchet up terror in J&K. It has been blaming India for its own failures in Balochistan. After the recent train hijacking there, the Pakistan army said it would take on Baloch militants as well as their facilitators and abettors inside or outside Pakistan. Army Chief Gen Asim Munir raked up Kashmir during a recent address to overseas Pakistanis. There have been reports of increased infiltration bids and ceasefire violations by the Pakistan army across the Line of Control (LoC).

Our government took the following decisions in response to the Pahalgam attack: the Indus Waters Treaty to be held in abeyance; immediate closure of the integrated check post at Attari; scrapping of the SAARC visa (meant for top functionaries and some other categories in SAARC nations) for Pakistanis; and overall strength of the respective High Commissions cut down from 55 to 30, along with the expulsion of Pakistani military, air and naval advisers from India. Subsequently, the government also decided to suspend visa services to Pakistani nationals.

No military CBMs (confidence-building measures) have been touched. With the exception of the first, the above measures are symbolic. The Indus treaty has already been in the doldrums, with India repeatedly asking for its modification. The suspension of this treaty, which continued functioning even during the wars of 1965 and 1971, is meant to mount pressure on Pakistan. It will give India a free hand in building hydroelectric and storage projects on Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. However, in the absence of the necessary infrastructure to store and divert Pakistan’s share of water for our own use, our capacity to withhold Pakistan’s water or regulate the timing of flow to hurt crop sowing there remains limited. Building such infrastructure in a mountainous terrain, besides being technically challenging, is costly and time-consuming.

Pakistan has reciprocated the steps on the land border closure, SAARC visa and the strength of missions. In addition, it has suspended Afghanistan’s exports to India through its territory, closed its airspace for all Indian aircraft, and said it shall exercise its right to hold all bilateral agreements with India, including but not limited to the Simla Agreement, in abeyance. This presumably covers military CBM agreements also.

Is Pakistan trying to question the sanctity of the LoC under the 1972 agreement? With its existing vulnerabilities, is Pakistan in a position to challenge it by waging a war against India? The neighbour has also threatened that any attempt to stop or divert its share of water under the Indus treaty will be considered an act of war and responded to with full force across the complete spectrum of national power. Pakistan has thus held out the nuclear threat as in earlier crisis situations.

The following factors need particular examination in the above context:

First, considering the telltale signs of a likely increase in Pak-sponsored terror, why were we unable to prevent the Pahalgam attack? To be sure, even the best counter-terror measures cannot plug all gaps for a determined adversary to get through. However, questions like how the presence of terrorists in the vicinity of the attack site, full of tourists, missed the attention of our intelligence; and why, going by media reports, there were no security personnel around to engage them, will continue to linger. I am sure the government will go into such issues to draw appropriate lessons.

Second, the measures announced so far are largely symbolic. In the case of the Indus treaty, we have to see what steps, if any, the government takes to enhance its impact on the ground in the short run. The Cabinet Committee on Security has resolved that perpetrators of the attack will be brought to justice and their sponsors held to account. Ideally, the government of the day should be able to choose the necessary retaliatory steps without the constraint of having to publicise them. However, the bar having been raised by the highly publicised Balakot strike after the egregious Pulwama attack has given rise to expectations of at least similar action now. We will have to wait and see what further retaliatory step(s) the government takes.

Third, the terrorists killed tourists after ascertaining their religion in a mischievous attempt to create communal friction in India. The befitting answer to them and their mentors is adherence to our tradition of religious harmony.

Finally, coercion is a means to an end by way of leveraging its impact to bring the adversary to a more reasonable position. Our coercive measures so far have not secured an enduring change in Pakistan’s conduct. We will have to wait and see the impact of the latest measures. Pakistan’s first response has been belligerent, aimed at creating a standoff to invite intervention by influential countries. Because of the nature of our relationship with Pakistan, coercion seems to be becoming an end in itself as there is no other endgame in sight. In this environment, the adversary can inflict pain on us occasionally in spite of the best efforts of our security setup.

Sharat Sabharwal is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.

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