A litany of lapses on the intel front

IN a rare and welcome development, the Union Government convened a closed-door all-party meeting, chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, two days after the Pahalgam terror attack. Media reports highlighted key strands of the deliberations.

The first was that all political parties agreed that India should fight terrorism unitedly. Union Minister Kiren Rijiu, who briefed the media, said: “Leaders of all parties have said in one voice that whatever step the government takes, we will support it.”

This consensus is to be cautiously welcomed as many leaders, in their public comments, sought to focus on national unity and eschew discord in the aftermath of the attack. They largely desisted from stoking communal/religious frenzy that has animated the domestic political discourse over the past decade. This orientation has weakened India’s societal harmony, with corrosive implications for internal security.

The fact that PM Narendra Modi chose not to attend the all-party meeting and was in Bihar for an election rally drew criticism from Opposition parties; his absence undermined the importance of the meeting. The question arises: If the Pahalgam attack prompted the PM to cut short his Saudi Arabia visit, should a state election rally have been accorded higher priority?

The meeting also saw a rare admission by the government regarding lapses that led to the Pahalgam tragedy. A leader, artfully described as being from the ‘ruling alliance’, was reported to have said, “If nothing had gone wrong, why would we be sitting here? There have been lapses somewhere that we have to find out.” This is a slender but positive departure from what happened after the Galwan clash in June 2020. Lapses, per se, merit a review.

Responding to questions from Opposition parties, the government said the local authorities did not inform security agencies before opening the Baisaran meadow, access to which usually remains restricted until the Amarnath Yatra in June. On the face of it, this is an odd assertion when so much has been invested in nurturing tourism in Kashmir after the composite state of J&K was bifurcated in 2019.

It was also revealed at the meeting that the site that was attacked by the terrorists is “a 45-minute uphill walk and no standard operating procedure (SOP) was in place to handle such emergencies swiftly.”

These glaring inadequacies are incongruous, given that Kashmir has a high-density security and intelligence grid. Even basic tourist emergency evacuation protocols for medical exigencies ought to have warranted adequate state preparation and presence in a meadow that attracts tourists in droves.

Will the lapses that led to the massacre of innocent tourists be identified in an objective and speedy manner? This is unlikely — and I fervently hope that I am proved wrong.

The track record is not encouraging. India has traditionally suffered serious security setbacks due to poor or inadequate intelligence inputs that were not good enough to be deemed actionable. From October 1947, when the first war for Kashmir was fought, to October 1962 (when China ‘surprised’ India) and the summer of 1999 in Kargil — intelligence lapses have been a recurring feature of the Indian security narrative.

After the Kargil war, then PM Vajpayee set up the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the late K Subrahmanyam. The findings related to the intelligence domain warrant a recall. The KRC report noted: “There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective-oriented interaction between agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies.”

A quarter century after such an unambiguous assessment about the policy correctives that have to be introduced in the opaque intelligence ecosystem, there is little tangible evidence to suggest that appropriate steps have been taken.

Yes, more agencies have been created to complement the effort of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), such as the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), but the lapses have recurred. The Parliament attack (December 2001), the Mumbai terror strikes (November 2008), the Pulwama suicide bombing (February 2019) and now the Pahalgam massacre are part of this litany.

The national intelligence infrastructure helmed by the Indian Police Service needs a thorough review by a blue-ribbon panel that will build on the KRC observations/recommendations and revamp it in the multi-disciplinary mode, which is the global template. A number of valuable reports and recommendations are available with the government and these need to be revisited.

Experts who have served in intelligence agencies have identified the building blocks for reforms and revamp. These include parliamentary oversight, appropriate legal status, operational accountability and periodic audits by independent professionals. This would have to be complemented by merit-based open recruitment and improved training, and better coordination and analysis of existing intelligence inputs with sustained funding to enhance current levels of technical intelligence (TECHINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.

The existing status quo favoured by the police and tacitly accepted by the political establishment has to be rewired. Hopefully, the Pahalgam attack will be the catalyst.

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