The Pahalgam Terror Attack May Well Be A Failure Of The Pakistan-Boycott Policy
The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, causing at least 28 casualties, mirrors the Pulwama massacre six years ago. With Article 370 abrogated and Jammu and Kashmir split into two union territories, the Modi government has been claiming that Pakistan is deterred and terrorism contained, if not eliminated. The latest attack undermines that narrative, despite recent peaceful local elections in J&K.
There were multiple warning signals, ignored by the custodians of Indian security. First was the belief that Pakistan’s preoccupation with subduing militancy in Balochistan and the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan left them no capacity to target India. Pakistan has been alleging an Indian hand in fomenting that trouble. India thus smugly ignored those signals, relishing the Pakistani army’s distractions.
Next was Pakistan’s internal political churn, pitting army chief General Syed Asim Munir against persecuted former prime minister Imran Khan. Their differences date back to Imran Khan’s suspected role in 2019 in getting the then army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, to remove him as the head of ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Subsequently, the army developed differences with Imran Khan, once their favourite to counter the Bhutto and Sharif dynasties. Amongst other issues was Pakistan adopting a more independent foreign policy, abandoning its traditional pro-US orientation. In fact, Imran Khan was in Moscow when Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022.
Once General Munir became army chief two years ago, the confrontation became political. The Sharif family, now running Pakistan, is beholden to the army for keeping Imran Khan out of power despite his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), winning the popular vote in the February 2024 election. Multiple cases were filed against Imran Khan, many on dubious grounds, to bar him from politics.
Imran Khan’s nationalist-Islamist populism begot him pan-Pakistan popularity, rivalling that of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Consequently, his persecution, especially the brutal dispersal of a pro-PTI rally on November 26, 2024, marching to Islamabad, has created fissures within the Pakistani army. One lieutenant general was earlier sacked, and many others were targeted.
Therefore, last week’s public rant by General Munir, reasserting the discarded 2-nation theory and rather crudely dubbing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular”, should have raised an alarm in Delhi. He was unleashing the ISI or had already done so. He declared total support for the, allegedly, India-exploited people of Kashmir. Clearly, the general was not only addressing intra-army fissures but also diverting public attention from the army’s failure to control domestic militancy. He did so by resurrecting the Kashmir issue.
This current situation reflects the failure of the Pakistan-boycott policy, in play since the 2019 Pulwama massacre, advocating non-engagement unless Pakistan abandoned sponsorship of terrorism. Another factor probably motivating the attack is the extradition by the US of 26/11 co-conspirator Tahawwur Rana. His interrogation can be expected to cast direct aspersions on the ISI.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s aborted Saudi visit indicates the seriousness of the developing scenario. The Balakot airstrike in 2019 set the bar for future Indian retaliation. The BJP strongly rebukes the Congress government’s inaction post-26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. Tahawwur Rana’s trial would have provided ample opportunity to drill this argument repeatedly. Now the focus has shifted instead to how the NDA government reacts to restore peace in the Valley.
US President Donald Trump’s prompt call to Prime Minister Modi can mean two things. That he was simply empathising with India at a moment of national distress. Alternatively, he also advocated restraint, as the last thing he wants after his tariff war and nuclear talks with Iran is an India-Pakistan military conflict. In fact, he played a role in managing a quick resolution after India’s Balakot attack and Pakistani retaliation. Trump was in East Asia when he and his team remotely managed de-escalation.
Many political figures and the so-called Godi media are demanding a strong military response. A positive feature is the Chinese distraction due to its trade war with the US. Thus, they would not encourage excessive Pakistani retaliation. If Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or its affiliates are involved, then a massive bombing of their headquarters at Muridke would be the correct punishment for present and past attacks on India. This was avoided post-Pulwama to avoid escalation. Probably a camp, like the one in Balakot, can be targeted in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The LOC ceasefire can also be dropped. An Indian attack in PoK forces Pakistan to only choose targets in Jammu and Kashmir. Because they would not want to alienate the Kashmiri population, military targets may be chosen.
With both nations possessing nuclear weapons, the Indian dilemma is to avoid total war. India should have by now created an Iron Dome-like defence, like Israel, to neutralise Pakistan’s missile capability. That has not happened pan-India, though it may cover parts of the national capital. But one lesson is obvious: However useful domestically, boycotting engagement with a neighbour with which major outstanding disputes linger is bad policy. That is why, six years after Pulwama, a fresh crisis is on the government's table.
KC Singh is former secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
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