Opinion: Elusive pathways to peace in Myanmar

New Delhi has pursued a multitude of policy options over the years to usher stability in Myanmar, arguably the most troubled neighbouring country, even ahead of Pakistan. From Nehru disavowing the plight of Indians in Burma for the sake of geopolitical prudence and thereby foregoing his much-vaunted constitutionalism, to backing Shri Shri Ravi Shankar as "a part of the peace effort" as posted by the official handle of the Indian Embassy in Yangon under the current administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, creativity is not missing in India’s foreign policy playbook.

It also indicates its intention to regain influence within Myanmar to protect its legitimate national security interests when it cannot compete with the economic might of the Chinese and their backing of instabilities in Myanmar. The humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery efforts of India in the aftermath of the unfortunate earthquake can be seen as another such endeavour in promoting its vishwamitra image. Though commendable and necessary, despite such efforts since 1947, influencing a pathway to peace in Myanmar remains elusive.

Historically, the regions of Chin, Rakhine, and Wa have been only under the notional control of the ruling regime, regardless of who it was. From the time of U Nu and Ne Win, these states of Myanmar have displayed secessionist tendencies, often fueled by Chinese support. With the coupé of 2021, these secessionist groups along with many others got a fillip. Myanmar has been in a state of civil war ever since, where not only the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) are fighting the Junta, but even self-styled people’s defence forces (PDFs) have mushroomed all over the country. Evidence shows that apart from Chinese involvement with the EAOs, even Western nations have been engaged with these PDFs aggressively.

While the National Unity Government (NUG) claims to be the legitimate government in exile of Myanmar and the central coordinating body of the EAOs and PDFs in their fight against the Junta, such claims are backed by little evidence on the ground. Most of the fighting is highly localised guerilla warfare, fought between the EAOs and/or the PDFs and the Tatmadaw. At the operational and tactical level, there seems to be some coordination between the EAOs like the Chin National Army (CNA), Kachin Independent Army (KIA), Arakan Army (AA), etc., as well as the numerous PDFs. However, strategic alliances do not exist. This is primarily because, while they have a common battlefield enemy in the Tatmadaw, their strategic goals do not always align in the long run. Here lies a key roadblock in the pathway to peace moderation, which seems to be a strategic objective of Indian foreign policy.

China on its part continues to extend tacit support to the EAOs, who in turn pass on some of the resources to the various PDFs within their sphere of influence. Beijing is also hedging its position by overtly backing the Junta diplomatically, militarily and economically. Myanmar provides another alternative to China’s Achilles Heel, the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, through which almost 80% of its imported energy supply travels. Thus, keeping the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project operational, irrespective of who rules Myanmar or its various regions, is in its long-term strategic interest. Also, fuelling a degree of instability serves Beijing’s interest by keeping New Delhi preoccupied with maintaining peace in the Northeast region (NE region).

On India’s part, the security of NE depends largely on stability in the bordering regions of Myanmar. Thus, it is only natural that India would aspire to bargain a truce among the warring parties. Reports of EAOs harbouring and supporting NE insurgents are not unusual. For the security of India’s NE, New Delhi has little choice but to deal with anyone who governs these bordering regions. However, as multiple PDFs have come to the fore post 2021, it is an overwhelming task for India to manage such relationships, especially as central command structures are absent. Reports also indicate that some of these insurgents are fighting the opposition forces at the behest of the Tatmadaw. Such reports are bound to heighten the anxieties of the Indian security apparatus. Additionally, economies of the EAOs and PDFs remain almost exclusively dependent on narcotics and to a lesser extent, weapons trafficking. These find their way to India’s NE and eventually to the rest of the country. This also leads to internal power struggles to assert control over these smuggling routes as evidenced in Manipur currently. India would want to ensure that any settlement with the EAOs includes control of their narcotics trade as well as cybercrimes.

Hence, a peaceful settlement in Myanmar will be in the larger interest of both the major players, India and China. However, as the strategic goals of both nations do not ally, a coordinated approach is lacking. Additionally, with the plethora of stakeholders involved, bringing all parties to the negotiation table for a compromised solution like a nationwide ceasefire seems unlikely at present.

One possible pathway to achieving a degree of normalcy could be regional autonomy for the EAOs, who would have to guarantee the disarming of the PDFs in their region in exchange for Tatmadaw’s promise of not engaging in violence. Signals from some of the major EAOs suggest that while they fight on the plank of secession, an appetite for full autonomy does exist. However, given China’s influence on the EAOs like the United Wa State Army, CNA, and AA, both India and Thailand may not see it in their long-term interest to back such settlement.

Thus, while desirable, a ceasefire in Myanmar seems unlikely in the short to medium term. This is because of the varied interests of individual stakeholders within the country as well as regional powers. Limited engagement with all warring parties and coaxing the Junta to secede some of its power in favour of autonomous federalism seems to be a legitimate policy option for India at present. Hence, though New Delhi should explore all options, some pragmatism may be a good practice in this regard.

The author is a strategic consulting and national security expert. He is a governing body member of the Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement (SHARE).

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