India-China Border Row: MoD Denies Info, Ignites Right-to-Know Debate

India-China Border Dispute: MoD Refuses Data Under RTI Exemption

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has rejected an RTI query from Bengaluru-based lawyer Ajay Kumar seeking year-wise data on Chinese occupation of Indian territory, citing security exemptions under the RTI Act, 2005. 

The MoD’s reply cites Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act, 2005, which exempts information that could prejudicially affect India’s sovereignty, integrity, or security. This follows an earlier vague response from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in February 2025, which claimed it lacked precise records on the same issue, pointing instead to static Lok Sabha replies from 2020 and 2022.

Kumar’s RTI, filed with both ministries, sought a detailed timeline of Chinese control over Indian land from the 1962 Sino-Indian War to the present, covering nine key dates tied to historic and recent flashpoints along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While the MEA sidestepped the query by claiming no further data existed, the MoD’s outright rejection under a security exemption has intensified scrutiny over the government’s handling of this critical national issue. The conflicting responses from two arms of the same government—one claiming ignorance, the other cloaking data in secrecy—raise troubling questions about transparency, coordination, and accountability.

India-China Border Dispute: What’s Wrong with MoD’s Reply?

The MoD’s invocation of Section 8(1)(a) is legally permissible but problematic in its application here. While the clause allows withholding information that could compromise national security, it does not grant blanket immunity from disclosure. The RTI Act mandates that exemptions be justified with specificity—something the MoD has failed to provide. By offering no explanation beyond a boilerplate citation, the ministry dodges a fundamental question: why can’t a citizen know the extent of their country’s territorial integrity over time? The lack of granularity in the refusal—whether the data is withheld due to active military operations, intelligence sensitivity, or diplomatic negotiations—leaves room for speculation about concealment.

Moreover, the MoD’s response clashes with the MEA’s earlier stance. If the MEA claims no records exist beyond broad figures (38,000 sq. km. in Ladakh and 90,000 sq. km. claimed in Arunachal Pradesh), how can the MoD justify withholding data it presumably possesses under a security exemption? This inconsistency suggests either a lack of coordination between ministries or a deliberate strategy to obscure the truth. As Kumar notes, “I am shocked to receive the response from the Ministry of Defence. What I have asked is only the extent of Chinese occupation. I have not asked any operational details. My question is, does a citizen not have the right to know how much of our country has been occupied by an enemy country? I will be going for a first appeal under the RTI act. How are two arms of the government of India giving me two different pieces of information on the same matter?” 

A Citizen’s Right to Know: Where’s the Line of Accountability?

At the heart of this issue lies a deeper concern: does a voting, taxpaying citizen not have the right to know how much of their country has been annexed or reclaimed? The India-China border dispute, spanning over six decades, is not just a military or diplomatic matter—it’s a question of national identity and sovereignty. Kumar argues, “Without knowing where India’s operational border stands with China, how can citizens hold the government accountable? Have we lost ground since Galwan? Have we regained territory through diplomacy? The silence on India-China border dispute is deafening.”

The RTI Act, enacted to empower citizens, balances transparency with security. Yet, the MoD’s blanket refusal—coupled with the MEA’s evasiveness—tilts this balance toward opacity. If the government cannot quantify Chinese occupation over time, it risks undermining public trust and weakening its negotiating stance with Beijing. Vagueness may shield short-term political embarrassment, but it leaves lawmakers and citizens in the dark, unable to assess whether military or diplomatic efforts are effective. 

As of March 2025, the India-China border situation remains fluid. Following the October 2024 agreement to resume pre-2020 patrolling in Depsang and Demchok, both sides have pulled back troops from key flashpoints in eastern Ladakh. The deal, announced ahead of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, was hailed as a step toward de-escalation after the 2020 Galwan clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar confirmed in early 2025 that disengagement was complete, with coordinated patrolling underway.

However, doubts linger. Reports about satellite imagery from late 2024 shows China continuing to bolster infrastructure—dual-use villages, roads, and military outposts—near the LAC, particularly in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Indian efforts to match this buildup, including the Vibrant Villages Program and new highways like the Arunachal Frontier Highway, signal a long-term militarisation trend.

Meanwhile, India-China diplomatic talks have stalled on broader boundary resolution. Adding to the ambiguity, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said on March 26, 2025, that India and China will face issues ‘in the foreseeable future’ but can address them without conflict—offering optimism but no clarity on territorial control.

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